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INTRODUCTION
For almost a century, a central problem (perhaps the central problem) of corporate law has been the separation of ownership from control
and the agency costs it generates. 1 Although it was not until 1976 that
Michael Jensen and William Meckling first formalized a theory of agency
costs, 2 the structural feature responsible for the corporate agency problem was the subject of a well-known corporate law text first published in
1933. In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Alfred Berle and Gardiner Means explain:
[I]t is no longer the individual himself who
uses his wealth. Those in control of that
wealth, and therefore in a position to secure
industrial efficiency and produce profits, are
no longer, as owners, entitled to the bulk of
such profits. Those who control the destinies of the typical modern corporation own
so insignificant a fraction of the company’s
stock that the returns from running the corporation profitably accrue to them in only a
very minor degree. The stockholders, on the
other hand, to whom the profits of the corporation go, cannot be motivated by those
profits to a more efficient use of the property, since they have surrendered all disposi*
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See William Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare, 74 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 767, 789 (2017) (describing the decades-long treatment by legal scholars of the
separation of ownership and control as an “over-arching political economic problem”
in need of a solution).
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tion of it to those in control of the enterprise . . . . Economic power, in terms of
control over physical assets, is apparently responding to a centripetal force, tending
more and more to concentrate in the hands
of a few corporate managements. At the
same time, beneficial ownership is centrifugal, tending to dive and subdivide, to split
into ever smaller units and to pass freely
from hand to hand. In other words, ownership continually becomes more dispersed . . . . 3
This “canonical account of U.S. corporate governance” 4 is no
longer accurate. Record ownership of securities is now concentrated in
the hands of large, institutional investors. 5 The beneficial owners on
whose behalf they hold securities are largely “forced capitalists,” (to borrow a term from Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. of the Delaware Supreme Court 6)—“ordinary Americans” whose only real option for financing their own retirement and children’s education is through regular
investments of income into a 401(k) plan or other tax-advantaged investment account. 7 The separation of ownership from control has trans-

3 Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 9 (1933).
4 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 864 (2013).

Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1824 (2011).

5

6 Leo E. Strine, Jr. Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007).

Id. Professor Anne Tucker calls them “citizen shareholders.” Anne M. Tucker, Locked
In: The Competitive Disadvantage of Citizen Shareholders, 125 YALE L. J. F. 163, 164 (2015).
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formed into the “separation of ownership from ownership.” 8 The era of
“agency capitalism” is well underway. 9
With the rise of agency capitalism comes an additional fiduciary
relationship in the ownership structure of many publicly-traded companies. 10 The fiduciary relationship between management and record owners of securities (the institutional investor) remains, 11 but the record
owners are now themselves fiduciaries that “hold equity . . . for their
beneficiaries.” 12 A pair of interlocking fiduciary relationships now exists,
and with it comes a level of intermediation between the issuers of securities and their beneficial owners. 13
Professor Lipton explores the relationship that exists between
one type of institutional investor—mutual funds—and their investors.
The fiduciary duties that are applicable in this context arise under both
state and federal law: the Investment Company Act of 1940 14 as well as
the state business association statutes under which mutual funds are organized impose duties on the directors and advisors of the funds. 15 But,
Rodrigues, supra note 5, at 1828. Professor Rodrigues attributes this phrase to Chief
Justice Strine.
8
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See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4, at 865.
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See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4, at 865.

See, e.g., Green v. Freeman, 749 S.E.2d 262 (N.C. 2013); Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d
196, 206 (Del. 2008); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280
(Del. 1989) (“In discharging this function, the directors owe fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.”).
11
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Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4, at 865.
See id.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-35; see also Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1328 (1975)
(“The directors of the Fund held a position of trust and confidence with respect to the
Fund’s shareholders, and owed them the obligations commonly associated with fiduciaries. Section 80a-35(b) explicitly imposed upon Chestnutt Corporation the standard
traditionally applied to persons in a fiduciary position . . . .”).
14

15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (provision of Investor Company Act of 1940); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963); LOIS YUROW ET AL., MUTUAL FUND
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK § 3:14 (2017) (“Federal law does not
provide any legal vehicle for organizing a mutual fund. Accordingly, a sponsor must
15
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as Professor Lipton demonstrates, application of fiduciary principles to
specific aspects of the advisor-fund-investor relationships raise difficult
issues. 16 In particular, what role should fiduciary duties play in mutual
fund proxy voting? And, are common voting practices—in particular
family voting—consistent with those duties?
In this Comment, I argue that a flexible approach to fiduciary duties is appropriate in this context. Given the variation in mutual fund
investors and fund strategy, there is no one-size-fits-all answer to how
mutual fund fiduciary duties require fund directors and advisers to vote
proxies. Recognizing the need to allow entity governance to reflect firmspecific circumstances and attributes, state law has incorporated varying
degrees of flexibility with regard to the traditional fiduciary duties that
apply in the context of the first agency relationship. As I argue below,
the second agency relationship—between record and beneficial owners—also requires a flexible approach. Specifically, application of fiduciary principles to mutual fund proxy voting practices should take into account the objectives of fund investors, fund strategy, and the ways in
which fund investors resemble customers.
THE DUAL STATUS OF MUTUAL FUND INVESTORS AND THE NEED
FOR FIDUCIARY FLEXIBILITY
In a very real sense, people who purchase shares in a mutual fund
play two roles at once—they are customers, 17 but they also provide capiorganize the fund under state law—typically as a business trust or a corporation. The
law of the state where the mutual fund is organized will affect the fund’s governance
and operation in areas that the Investment Company Act has not preempted.”).
M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary Obligation, 19 TENN. J.
BUS. L. 175 (2017).
16Ann

17 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors, and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH.
U. L. Q. 1017, 1037 (“[M]utual fund investments are products . . . . “); Ribstein, supra
note 19. Professor Ribstein seems to argue in favor of treating mutual fund investors
as customers and nothing more. In his words, “[m]utual fund investors buy a product
rather than investing in a firm, and the law should treat investors accordingly.” Id. at
303. Advocates for this position look to the ability of mutual fund investors’ right to
redeem—or “cash out”—their shares. Not all mutual fund investors actually have this
ability, however. Those “forced capitalists” who invest through tax-advantaged ac-
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tal and have the legal status of shareholders or trust beneficiaries (depending on how the fund is organized 18). In this regard, they are the beneficiaries of traditional, corporate-style fiduciary duties. 19 The Investment Company Act of 1940 implicitly recognizes the tension between
these two capacities (shareholder and customer) insofar as it specifically
provides for a fiduciary duty owed by investment advisers “with respect
to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material
nature, paid by such registered investment company or by the security
holders thereof . . . .” 20 This dual capacity is, perhaps, most obvious
when it comes to investors in a low-fee index fund. 21 Such investors are
looking for cheap diversification-they are buying a piece of the market
and are looking to the mutual fund as a way to do so without incurring
the costs that would be involved in purchasing individual securities in the
companies that are part of the index. They are, in effect, purchasing the
bundling and administrative services of the mutual fund and its adviser.
The same applies to actively-managed funds, through which investor-

counts provided by their employers are limited to the funds included in the plan and
face a variety of barriers to exit. See Anne M. Tucker, Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage of Citizen Shareholders, 125 YALE L. J. F. 163 (2015). For this reason, mutual fund
investors are best understood as having a dual or mixed status, rather than as exclusively customers or exclusively investors.
Mutual funds are typically organized as either Delaware or Massachusetts trusts or as
Maryland corporations. Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Contours: Perspectives on Mutual
Funds and Private Funds, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MUTUAL FUNDS (William A. Birdthistle & John D. Morley eds.) (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2800305.
18

Larry E. Ribstein, Federal Misgovernance of Mutual Funds, 2010 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 301,
306 (2009-2010).
19

20

15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2017).

“Index funds . . . are designed to closely track a specific benchmark, allowing investors to invest money knowing that they will get performance roughly equal to the performance of the benchmark followed.” K.J. Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Overpaying
For Closet Index Funds: A Legal Analysis, 36 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP.
1, 3 (April 2017).
21
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customers purchase the expertise of the fund manager whose efforts will
hopefully lead to returns that exceed some specified benchmark. 22
This dual capacity is, in large part, what makes assessing the contours of the fiduciary duties difficult, 23 especially in relation to proxy voting. Family voting, the practice that Professor Lipton focuses on in her
article, does not seem to categorically implicate the duty of loyalty, although it is clear that certain policies would be violations and that circumstances relating to particular votes could involve a conflict of interest. 24 Family voting could raise duty of care issues for directors of a particular fund (if, for example, they defer to the investment adviser without
considering the issue in their own capacity as director of a particular
fund), but even the SEC has acknowledged that extensive research may
not be cost-effective and, therefore authorizes funds to refrain from voting on issues if the costs involved in researching the issue and reaching a
decision outweigh the potential benefits of an informed vote. 25 Furthermore, fund directors and investment advisers can articulate princi-

K.J. Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Overpaying For Closet Index Funds: A Legal Analysis, 36 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1, 3 (April 2017) (“Actively managed funds are operated with the goal of producing returns that outperform a
particular benchmark (providing higher returns or lower risk, or both) by carefully
choosing stocks that fit the fund's investing style and that the manager expects to collectively outperform other holdings in the fund's style space.”).
22

23 Langevoort, supra note 17, at 1037–38 (“Once the mutual fund is viewed as a product
to be marketed within liberal societal expectations as to fair advertising like any other,
then any notion that the producer is a ‘fiduciary’ is awkward and disorienting. The
transaction is instead simply embedded in the morals of the marketplace. To be sure,
the law disagrees--the adviser is deemed a fiduciary to the fund and its investors. From a
business standpoint, however, the law's move makes little sense.”).

If, for example, the fund officers employed by an investment adviser had funds in the
family vote to benefit the adviser’s pension business.
24

See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 (Feb. 7, 2003)
(“We do not suggest that an adviser that fails to vote every proxy would necessarily
violate its fiduciary obligations. There may even be times when refraining from voting a
proxy is in the client’s best interest, such as when the adviser determines that the cost
of voting the proxy exceeds the expected benefit to the client.”).
25
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pled defenses of family voting policies on both economic and other
grounds. 26
When the dual capacity of mutual fund investors is taken into account, it becomes clear that there is more than one way for mutual fund
directors to manage those funds for the benefit of fund investors. For
those investor/customers who have placed their money in a low-fee index fund, family voting may, on the whole, be completely consistent with
the fiduciary obligations of the fund investors. Increased costs incurred
as a result requiring each fund’s board to either independently research
each proxy issue or form a fund-specific conclusion based on common
research would result in higher administrative costs for investors. When
those investors’ objectives are taken into account (fundamentally, cheap
diversification as a stable investment strategy to finance future spending)
it may very well be that family voting is in their best interests. No doubt,
there have been and will continue to be votes which ultimately do not
ultimately benefit the investors in these funds. However, family voting
may still be in their best interests overall if the increased costs of fundspecific voting are not offset by better returns. It’s worth noting, as well,
that votes in which family voting is not in the best interest of investors in
low-fee funds will not always be obvious ex ante. A fiduciary duty rule
that requires individualized voting on certain categories of votes will almost certainly be over-inclusive, thereby forcing increased costs onto
mutual funds and their investors in connection with votes for which
family voting presents no issues. In the parlance of agency cost theory,
my point is really a reminder that agency costs can take many forms—
measures adopted to prevent or otherwise mitigate the costs imposed by
deviant agents will themselves create costs, a point reflected in Jensen &
Meckling’s formal definition of agency costs. 27
Family voting policies create economies of scale. See, e.g., Stephen Choi et al. , Who
Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 36, 38
(2013). Family voting policies can also be used to increase leverage with portfolio companies, which may be used to benefit all of the funds in the family when needed. See
Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1419, 1465–66 (2002).
26

27

See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2.
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The same might not hold true for actively-managed funds. For
those funds—in which investors purchase shares with the hopes of securing returns in excess of some benchmark—fiduciary principles may
require more individualized, active involvement in decisions related to
proxy voting. If investors are not simply seeking low-cost diversification
and are, instead, seeking superior returns on account of the skill and expertise of the fund’s adviser and directors, their fiduciary duties may very
well require that they do more to consider the significance of each vote
to the fund and its objectives.
The need for fiduciary flexibility is not a new observation. Returning to the first agency relationship (between management and record
holders), state law already recognizes its importance. Uniform statutes
governing alternative entities—partnerships, limited partnerships, and
limited liability companies—recognize the ability to alter and eliminate
fiduciary duties, provided such departures from the default fiduciary duties are not manifestly unreasonable. 28 Delaware’s alternative entity statutes have embraced fiduciary flexibility completely and allow total elimination without any backstop for unreasonable alterations. 29 Notably,
Delaware extends this ability even to publicly traded alternative entities. 30
Even in the context of corporations, where fiduciary duties remain mandatory, state law often offers some degree of flexibility to narrow certain

See, e.g., REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(b)(3) (2017) (allowing partnership agreements to alter or eliminate various fiduciary duties if those changes are not
“manifestly unreasonable); REVISED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 110(d).
28

29 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 17-1101(d)
(2013); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §
17-1101(c) (2013).

See, e.g., Hite Hedge LP v. El Paso Corp., 2012 WL 4788658 (Del. Ch. 2012); In re
Atlas Energy Resources, LLC, 2010 WL 4273122 (Del. Ch. 2010).
30
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aspects of the duty of loyalty. 31 And, of course, corporate charters are
authorized to include provisions which take much of the “bite” out of
the duty of care. 32
This flexibility recognizes the fact that mandatory, one-size-fitsall terms—even ones that are well-suited to most situations—impose
costs and create inefficiencies when applied outside the context for
which they were designed. 33 Different businesses need different governance rules, and even the same company may need one set of rules today
and a different set at some point in the future. “[E]ven a rule that is
formulated by an all-wise and disinterested policymaker cannot suit every
business equally well, any more than a well-made suit is right for everybody.” 34
By way of illustration, consider the governance of publicly-traded
alternative entities, which are widely known as master limited partnerships (or MLPs). The flexibility afforded to these entities under Delaware law has allowed the adoption of governance structures that are tailored to the business models of these entities and the objectives of their
investors. On account of Internal Revenue Code restrictions on source
of income, 35 almost all of these entities are in the energy and natural reDEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122 (17) (providing that a Delaware corporation has the
power to “[r]enounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of
directors, any interest or expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered an opportunity to participate in, specified business opportunities or specified classes or categories of business opportunities that are presented to the corporation or one or more
of its officers, directors or stockholders”); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT §
2.02(6).
31

32

DEL. COD. ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 2.02(4).

33 Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the
Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 53–64 (1990). In the case of fiduciary duties,
some argue that they should not even be default rules on account of the contracting and
litigation costs they impose. Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual
Duties in Delaware Limited Partnership and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L. J. 221,
238–42 (2009).
34

Butler, supra note 33, at 57.

I.R.C. § 7704 (2017). This section of the Internal Revenue Code requires that a publicly-traded alternative entity will be treated as a corporation for tax purposes unless

35
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sources sector. Their tax treatment allows them to make tax-advantaged
cash distributions to their investors, 36 and for this reason, MLP units are
widely considered to be yield securities. 37 Investors that buy MLP units
do so with strong expectations of regular cash distributions. Most MLPs
eliminate (or significantly pare down) traditional fiduciary duties 38 and
with good reason. The imposition of a rigid, traditional duty of loyalty to
these entities would have a negative effect on a variety of related-party
transactions that are undertaken on a regular basis and often lead to increases in cash distributions for investors. 39 Although the absence of traditional fiduciary duties certainly enables some degree of management
misbehavior, 40 imposing such a duty in the name of investor protection
would actually imperil the objectives that MLP investors have when they
90% or more of its income is “qualifying income” which includes that “derived from
the exploration, development, mining or production, processing, refining, transportation (including pipelines transporting gas, oil, or products thereof), or the marketing of
any mineral or natural resources . . .”. I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E) (2017).
See, e.g., John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. L. 471, 472
(2005) (“[A] publicly-traded limited partnership that generates almost exclusively qualifying income is not subject to entity-level taxation. A dollar of income generated by
such a partnership would only be taxed once (“passed-through”), at the marginal tax
rate of the limited partner to whom that dollar of income was allocated. Accordingly,
assuming that the relevant entity distributes all of its income to its equity holders and
that the equity holder's marginal tax rate is thirty-five percent, an MLP must generate
$1.54 of income for an equity holder to have one dollar of after-tax income, although a
corporation must generate $2.20 of income for its equity holder to have one dollar of
after-tax income.”).
36

See, e.g., Deborah Fields et al., Triangles in a World of Squares: A Primer on Significant U.S.
Federal Income Tax Issues for Natural Resources Publicly Traded Partnerships (Part I), TAXESTHE TAX MAGAZINE, Dec. 2009, at 21, 30 (“From a market perspective, investors typically view a PTP unit as a yield-based security.”).

37

See Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence
from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 562–64 (2012) (documenting
widespread elimination of fiduciary duties in the operating agreements of publicly traded limited partnership and limited liability companies).
38

See Jonathan G. Rohr, Freedom of Contract and the Publicly Traded Uncorporation, 14 NYU
J. L. & BUS. 247, 301 (2017).
39

See, e.g., In re El Paso Pipeline Partners L.P. Derivative Litigation, 2014 WL 2768782 (Del.
Ch. June 12, 2014).
40

2017]

MUTUAL FUND PROXY VOTING

215

purchase units insofar as that rule would almost certainly lead to fewer
accretive transactions. Furthermore, investors’ expectations of cash distributions can themselves act as a constraint on management’s behavior,
at least insofar as misbehavior will compromise the entity’s ability to
meet or surpass distribution expectations. 41 In this context, there are
good reasons to depart from traditional fiduciary duties, and overall, state
law accommodates those reasons.
The same concerns should inform any attempts to clarify the fiduciary duty of mutual fund directors – mutual funds are not homogenous; nor are their investor-customers. Any duty imposed to help those
investors should be consistent with their dual status and their investment
objectives—for investors in a low-cost, index fund, a rule which would
increase the fees paid by those investors without offsetting increases in
the returns they enjoy would not actually be in the best interests of those
investors. A sector-specific, actively managed fund, on the other hand,
may benefit from independent, fund-specific research and decisionmaking and, in this regard, its investors may be best served by something
other than family voting. Any attempt to apply general fiduciary principles to the voting practices of mutual funds should take into account the
fund’s strategy and how investors in that fund are best served in relation
to that strategy.
CONCLUSION
The era of agency capitalism is well-underway and with it a refocusing of corporate lawmaking and scholarship. The Berle & Means paradigm no longer holds true, and the legal principles that matured in the
age of the Berle & Means corporation have uneasy application in a world
of institutional investors and multiple layers of ownership. In her Article, Professor Lipton raises the uneasy fit between traditional fiduciary
principles and mutual fund proxy voting practices, specifically whether
family voting policies are consistent with the fiduciary obligations of

See Rohr, supra note 39, at 275–76; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Energy Infrastructure Investment and the Rise of the Uncorporation, 23 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 75, 80 (2011) (noting the
trade-off between cash distribution requirements and more traditional governance features like fiduciary duties).
41
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fund boards and advisors. 42 Complicating this inquiry is the dual nature
of mutual fund investors—they provide capital in their capacity as shareholders and, in that regard, benefit from traditional fiduciary duties. But,
they are also customers who (depending on the time of fund) seek and
pay for low cost diversification or the investing prowess of the investment advisor. For this reason, attempts to apply traditional fiduciary
principles to mutual fund voting practices become tricky. Family voting
raises obvious duty of loyalty and duty of care issues, but it is also not
without strong justifications. The practice permits funds to capitalize on
economies of scale and leads to lower fees, an important consideration
for the millions of mutual fund investors looking for low-cost diversification. Any attempt to apply traditional fiduciary duty analysis to mutual
fund voting should take into account the dual capacity of mutual fund
investor-customers and their investment objectives. For low-fee, index
funds – whose investors are ultimately seeking to own a piece of the
market and avoid the high transaction costs involved in compiling a
portfolio of securities on their own – voting policies designed to minimize fees may very well be consistent with the best interests of investors,
even if there are occasional votes in which conflicts exist between that
fund and others in the family.

42

Lipton, supra note 16.

